按：本文来自《经济学人》2月4日刊。曾几何时，被大城市的年轻人嗤之以鼻的本土手机品牌OPPO和Vivo悄悄击败了苹果、小米，占据了中国手机销售的王座，读完本文你将了解到它们成功的原因，以及整个中国手机业未来的趋势。不由感叹，在中国“农村包围城市”的战略永远都是对的。

Smartphones in China

Upstarts on top

DONGGUAN
How OPPO and Vivo are beating Apple, Xiaomi and the gang

弯道超车的本土品牌

1）DONGGUAN, a southerly Chinese city near Hong Kong, is better known for cranking out cheap trinkets than for producing high-end equipment of any kind. And yet, amid the grit and grime is a gleaming low-rise factory producing some 50m smartphones a year for OPPO, a firm started by China’s BBK Electronics but which is now run independently.

crank out : to produce a lot of something very quickly
e.g. He cranked out three novels last year.

1）东莞是中国南方、香港附近的一个城市，比起生产任何 高端 的设备，它更为人所知的是 大量制造 便宜的 小商品 。然而， 在砂粒和尘埃之中 有一家 闪闪发光的 低层的工厂，它每年为OPPO生产约5千万部智能手机。OPPO是一家由中国的步步高电子创始，但现在独立运营的公司。

2）Inside, as well as the usual assembly lines and serried workers, the factory has dozens of staff in quality engineering and testing, conducting 130 different tests on OPPO’s phones before they are released to the market. Such zealous pursuit of quality would be expected of factories that produce phones for Apple—the world-class facilities run by Taiwan’s Foxconn in nearby Shenzhen house similar teams. But it is unusual at a firm that makes relatively inexpensive handsets for the local market.
2）在内部，除了通常可见的装配线和 密集排列的 工人，工厂还有数十名负责质量工程和检测的工作人员，在OPPO手机被投放到市场之前进行130个不同方面的测试。这样 对质量狂热的追求 在为苹果生产手机的工厂是很常见的——运行着世界一流设施的台湾富士康在附近的深圳 拥有 类似的团队。但是，这对于一家为本土市场制造相对便宜的手机的公司是不寻常的。

3）OPPO, and its sister firm, Vivo, also a child of BBK, started out in 2004 and 2009 respectively, making cheap and cheerful phones like plenty of other obscure Chinese manufacturers. They probably didn’t even register on Apple’s radar. Xiaomi was the Chinese handset-maker to watch; urban sophisticates , enticed by viral marketing , flocked to its slick devices. But in June 2016 OPPO’s R9, which costs around $400, overtook the iPhone, which is priced at twice that, as China’s best-selling handset. Vivo, which targets younger consumers with lower prices, is also surging.

urban sophisticate : A middle 20's to middle 30's aged person that employs the urban city living experience

3）OPPO及其姊妹公司Vivo（也是步步高的孩子）分别始于2004年和2009年，制造廉价和令人眼前一亮的手机，就像许多其他 名不见经传的 中国制造商。他们可能甚至没有被苹果的雷达关注过。小米是中国手机制造商中值得注意的； 城市里的年轻人 在 病毒营销 的诱导下，对其 华而不实的 设备趋之若鹜。但是在2016年6月，OPPO的R9（价格约为400美元）超过了iPhone（其售价是R9的两倍）成为中国最畅销的手机。以更低的价格吸引年轻消费者的 Vivo也在快速增长。

4）The two brands’ achievements are remarkable. Two years ago they were struggling to join China’s top five smartphone makers; now they are among the biggest five globally. One out of every three smart- phones sold in China in the third quarter of 2016 carried one of their brands ; in 2012 their combined share was below 3%.
4）两个品牌的成就是显著的。两年前，他们正在挣扎着加入中国五大智能手机厂商之中；现在他们位列全球最大的五个之中。在2016年第三季度在中国销售的每三部智能手机中就有一部 带有它们的品牌 ；而在2012年，它们合在一起的份额低于3％。

5）That should give Apple pause . Tim Cook, its boss, predicted in 2013 that China would become his firm’s biggest market. But iPhone sales there have stagnated (see chart). In the third quarter its market share fell to 7.1%, down from 11.4% a year earlier.

give pause to sb/give sb pause : to make someone stop and consider carefully what they are doing
e.g. Weather conditions were bad enough to give pause to even the most experienced climbers. 天气十分恶劣, 即使最有经验的登山者也犹豫不决.

5）这应该让苹果 停下来认真思考 。 2013年，他的老板蒂姆·库克（Tim Cook）预测，中国将成为其公司最大的市场。但是iPhone销售停滞不前（见图）。在第三季度，其市场份额下降到7.1％，低于一年前的11.4％。

图片来自《经济学人》

6）Xiaomi has even more reason to fret . About six years ago it bet on an “ asset-light ” strategy, meaning it relied almost entirely on selling its phones online. This worked brilliantly when the overall market for smartphones was growing, and the richest cities, with the largest number of tech-aware consumers, were booming. Xiaomi was once valued at some $46bn, but its fortunes in China have plunged .
6）小米有更多的理由 担心 。大约六年前，它把赌注押在“ 轻资产 ”的战略上，这意味着它几乎完全依赖于线上来销售手机。当智能手机的整体市场不断增长，而且大量有科技意识的消费者所在的最富有的城市也在蓬勃发展时，这项策略非常有效。小米曾经的市值约460亿美元，但它在中国的财富已经在 暴跌 。

7）That is chiefly due to the fact that growth has shifted sharply to the rising middle classes in smaller cities. Consumers there are less experienced with smart-phones than their fancier cousins in Beijing and Shanghai, and are wary of buying them online. They want to touch and compare handsets. OPPO and Vivo spotted this difference early. OPPO in particular shot to the top because it invested heavily in bricks-and-mortar retail distribution in lower-tier cities. Today the firm’s phones are sold at some 200,000 retail outlets across the mainland, which gives its salesmen the chance to coddle customers and nudge them to buy pricier phones.

shot to the top : to suddenly become very successfu
bricks-and-mortar : relating to or being a traditional business serving customers in a building as contrasted to an online business
e.g. brick-and-mortar classrooms; a brick-and-mortar bookstore
nudge ：to gently persuade or encourage someone to take a particular decision or action
e.g. We're trying to nudge them towards a practical solution.

7）这主要是由于增长已经迅速转移到较小城市中上升的中产阶级身上了。那儿的消费者在智能手机方面的经验比他们在北京和上海的表亲要少，并且对在线购买比较谨慎。他们想要触摸和比较手机。 OPPO和Vivo很早就发现了这种差异。尤其OPPO 突然大获成功 是因为它在 较低级 城市的 实体 零售渠道中投资巨大。今天，该公司的手机在大陆的大约20万个零售点销售，这给了其销售人员 悉心照料 客户并 温柔地说服 他们购买更昂贵的手机的机会。

8）At first, OPPO’s strategy was master-minded by Duan Yongping, founder of BBK, who began by selling basic electronics. He is known in China as “Duanfett”, a play on Warren Buffett, because of his financial acumen and also his admiration for Mr Buffett (he paid over $600,000 at an auction to have lunch with him in 2007). Mr Duan has since retired, but still influences the firms’ cultures.
8）起初，OPPO的战略是由步步高的创始人段永平主导的，他刚开始销售的是基础电子产品。在中国他被称为“段菲特”，对沃伦·巴菲特的一种戏仿，因为他对金融的敏锐以及他对巴菲特的崇拜（2007年他为了和巴菲特一起吃饭在拍卖会花了超过60万美元）。段先生已退休，但仍然影响企业的文化。

9）It took discipline not to be waylaid by the striking (though short-lived) success of Xiaomi’s hype-fuelled internet strategy. Many other companies tried to copy it. From 2011 to 2013, insiders say, OPPO looked hard at expanding its online sales channels, but decided against it. Sky Li, managing director of OPPO’s international mobile business, says the reason lies in her firm’s long-held adherence to the philosophy of ben fen—loosely translated, sticking to one’s knitting .

stick to one’s knitting : if a person or company sticks to their knitting, they continue to do what they have always done instead of trying to do something they know very little about
e.g. He believes the key to a company's success is to stick to its knitting rather than trying to diversify.

9）需要自制力才能不因小米 通过炒作推泼助澜的 互联网战略所带来的醒目的（虽然短命的）成功而 改变战略 。许多其他公司试图复制它。从2011年到2013年，内部人士说，OPPO曾努力想扩大其在线销售渠道，但最终决定反对这项策略。 OPPO国际移动业务总经理李炳忠说，原因在于她的公司长期坚持“本分”的理念——宽松地翻译，“本分”的意思是“ 坚持传统 ”。

10. Instead, OPPO became still more expert at incentivising its physical retailers. It has shown itself willing to share some of its profits with local stores. It uses a sophisticated system of subsidies that vary by model and season. One retailer in a small town in Sichuan says that although he sells many brands of smartphones, OPPO’s generous subsidies make him extra-eager to peddle its wares.
    10）与线上相比，OPPO在 激励 实体零售商方面更加专业。它自身已表明愿意与当地零售商分享利润。它使用一个复杂的补贴制度，根据型号和季节而变化。四川一个小城镇的一家零售商说，尽管他销售了许多品牌的智能手机，OPPO的慷慨补贴使他尤其渴望 兜售 它的产品。

11）That has its costs, of course: OPPO does not disclose the size of its total subsidies nor its profit margin, which may be low compared with other smartphone makers. Fat profits are hard to come by in China’s giant smartphone market. Because it is simple for firms to outsource almost every aspect of phonemaking, from designing components and chipsets to contract manufacturing , the barrier to entry is low (the physical networks that OPPO and Vivo have built will be far harder to replicate than an online presence). Teeming firms means vicious price competition , especially for cheaper phones. The price of a Chinese smartphone may drop to as little as $50, analysts reckon.
11）当然，这也是有代价的：OPPO没有披露其总补贴的规模或其利润率，这可能低于其他智能手机制造商。中国巨大的智能手机市场难以获得丰厚的利润。因为公司几乎可以外包生产手机的每个方面，从设计组件和芯片组到 契约式生产 ，进入门槛很低（OPPO和Vivo构建的物理网络比在线模式要难以复制得多） 。 大量的 公司意味着 恶性价格竞争 ，特别是对于更便宜的手机来说。分析师估计，中国智能手机的价格可能会下降到50美元。

12）Pressures at home explain why Chinese firms are also looking abroad. In the fourth quarter of 2016, Xiaomi and Vivo were vying with each other behind Sam-sung in the race for second place in India’s smartphone market. Huawei, a local telecoms-equipment giant that ranks third in the domestic market, already makes two- fifths of its sales outside China; Shao Yang of its consumer-business group says this share will rise to three-fifths within five years. OPPO is already a force in India, and is in second place in South-East Asia behind Samsung. It has opened a new marketing centre in Cairo to spearhead expansion in Africa and the Middle East.
12）国内的压力解释了为什么中国公司也在寻找国外市场。在2016年第四季度，小米和Vivo在三星之后展开 激励竞争 ，争夺印度智能手机市场第二的位置。华为是一家在国内市场排名第三的本地电信设备巨头，在中国境外的销售已经占其五分之二；其消费者业务集团的邵洋表示，这一份额将在五年内上升到五分之三。 OPPO已经是印度市场上的一支力量，在东南亚地区紧随三星位居第二。它在开罗开设了一个新的营销中心，在非洲和中东展开扩张。

13）Kevin Wang of IHS Markit, a research firm, nonetheless reckons that a round of consolidation must be on its way. Within five years, he reckons, most of the 50 or so local Chinese phone manufacturers will be gone. If OPPO and Vivo can stay at the summit, that would be nearly as surprising as the dizzying speed of their ascent.
13）尽管如此，一家研究公司IHS Markit的Kevin Wang认为，一轮 联合 势在必行。在五年内，他估计，50多个中国本土手机制造商中的大多数将会消失。如果OPPO和Vivo可以留在巅峰，这将是和它们 令人晕眩的 上升速度一样令人惊讶的。

原文出处：经济学人杂志

译者：安东Anton

关键字：产品经理, 业界动态, OPPO

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